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Abstract

Title of Dissertation: Examining

the

island

states

process

of

planning,

preparedness, and response to the oil spills using a case
study of the mv Wakashio oil spill
Degree:

Master of Science

The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the planning, preparedness, and
response of island states to oil spills response, identify the challenges faced, and
examine how to address those challenges. Most of major maritime accidents may end
up with oil spills and oil spills are significant threat to the marine environment and
they cause an impact on human, environmental and social sectors. International
frameworks and regulations are in place to prevent and manage oil spill incidents and
most of the states have adopted instructions and legally binding instruments with
regard to the management of oil spills to their national laws. Regardless of all the plans
regulations and other documents some countries find themselves unable to manage oil
spills and are faced with issues regarding liabilities and compensation for oil pollution
damages.
In this study, qualitative research method is used with a case study of the m.v.
Wakashio incident in Mauritius Island in July 2020. A total of 11 semi-structured
interviews were conducted, and selecting personnel to be interviewed for this study
was a purposeful selection method and most of the interviewees were mainly involved
with the oil spills management and had the requisite expertise. From the interviews
two themes were created which are risks and stakeholders. Risks associated with the
planning and preparedness to the oil spill and stakeholders associated in response to
the oil spill.
The findings from this study discuss what actually happened in m.v. Wakashio oil spill
and gap of knowledge and preparedness in addressing the incident. Further, it
discusses the challenges during the oil spill management specially how the global
pandemic affected the oil spill response. The study also explores how communities
were affected by the oil spill alongside the stakeholder response and how they
addressed to the situation.
Based on the findings, this study recommends to make policy and planning aimed at
reducing the likelihood of oil spills, providing effective emergency response, and
facilitating recovery and to conduct comparative study of oil spill accidents occurred
during and before COVID – 19.
KEYWORDS: Oil Spill, Preparedness, Response, Contingency Plan, Compensation,
m.v. Wakashio, Bunker Spill
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1.0 Introduction
During the last two decades, there have been a large number of oil spills all over the
world from tankers and non-tanker vessels. Of those, there were 243 from oil tankers,
spilling approximately 360,000 tons of oil into the sea (ITOPF,2018). At the same
time, non-tanker vessels’ spills have also been significant during the last two decades
(see Table 1), and some bulk carriers and large container ships carry more fuel than
tankers carry as cargo (Zhu,2007). Therefore, non-tanker vessel oil spills also pose a
risk of harm to the environment and the economy of the states. Even though non-tanker
vessels may carry a smaller quantity of oil, the location of the spill has a great influence
on the cost of the spill, as it will determine the degree of response required, as well as
the degree of damage to the environment and the economy (USCG,2007).
Table 1: Oil Spills incidents from non-tanker vessels from year 2005 to 2021(Source;
ITOPF)
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As per Table 1, there were some oil spills in island states which resulted in a huge
impact on the environment and the economy of the country, though the quantity of the
oil was less compared with the tanker accident. For example, environmental damage
was estimated at around $51 million after an oil spill on Solomon Island in 2019 (Fox,
2020). Recent non-tanker oil spills that happened off Mauritius Island when the MV
Wakashio grounded off the east coast of Mauritius on July 25, 2020, caused a greater
threat to the environment and economy of the country (UNCTAD,2020). When
studying the oil spills, the small island states have a high degree of inherent
vulnerability related to external factors because they tend to be small, remote, face
environmental challenges, and have a limited resource base (FAO,2014). There are
currently 39 Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and their combined population is
63.2 million people (UN 2014). Biodiversity is an important issue for the sustenance
of many SIDS, since industries like tourism and fishing can account for more than half
of the GDP of the economies of small islands (UN-OHRLLS,2021). SIDS are
comprised of a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $575.3 billion
(UNESCO,2019) and when compared with a developed country like the UK’s GDP of
$2.7 trillion (World Bank,2020), it is very less.
This study focused on oil spill preparedness and response of small island states and
was mainly discussed on Mauritius Island. The most discussed strategic islands in the
Indian Ocean are Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles (Baruah, 2018). The
Indian Ocean is home to the main sea routes connecting the Middle East, Africa, and
East Asia with Europe and America.
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Sri Lanka
Maldives

Mauritius

Figure 1: Major Shipping routes in the Indian Ocean
(Source; https://gcaptain.com/heres-why-so-much-world-trade-passes-mauritius/)
These major shipping routes carry more than half of the world's oil and the volume of
container shipping through the region's ports has increased from 46 million TEUs in
2000 to 166 million TEUs in 2017 (Kannangara et al., 2018).Therefore, the large
number of ships poses a significant risk of oil pollution from ships to coastal states
which their economy is mainly dependent on fisheries, aquaculture, and tourism,
especially considering the steady increase in the size of ships and the corresponding
amount of bunker fuel oil carried (see Table 2) by vessels of all types
(UNCTAD,2012).
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Table 2: Fuel carrying capacity of vessels (Source; Freight Waves,2020;
AgFlow.2021)

The grounding of the vessel MV Wakashio, off the coast of Mauritius, drew attention
to countries’ preparedness and response arrangements for oil spills and other
hazardous marine pollution incidents (Swanepoel,2020). However, events in
Mauritius have highlighted the role of international frameworks in this field and the
importance of encouraging all countries to adopt the latest legal instruments among
themselves (Asariotis & Premti, 2020). The main objective of the relevant
international legal framework is to enable countries to prevent pollution, respond to
pollution, and determine liability in the event of an accident (Asariotis & Premti,
2020). Although international treaties establish binding obligations for cooperation in
response actions, there are gaps in the regulation of the prevention of such oil spills
(Shapovalova, 2019). If countries, particularly developing countries, are not parties to
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international liability and compensation instruments, it will be extremely difficult for
them to restore the environment and socioeconomic issues caused by oil spills.
1.1 Problem Statement
Maritime oil spills are a significant threat to the marine environment and they have an
impact on human, environmental, and social sectors. Most major maritime accidents
may end up with oil spills. As a result, every country should have plans in place to
respond to, prevent, and manage any oil spills in their waters. Further countries should
come forward to mutually support each other through regional contingency plans by
sharing knowledge, resources, and technology. International organizations, including
IMO, have adopted several guidelines, instructions, and legally binding instruments
with regard to the management of oil spills. Regardless of all the plans, regulations,
and other documents, some countries find themselves unable to manage oil spills and
are faced with issues regarding liabilities and compensation for oil pollution damage.
So it is important to know that this issue is only faced by some particular states or all
the states other than landlocked. Therefore, it is necessary to study which states are
most facing the issues of managing oil spills and what the reasons are for them.
1.2 Objectives
The purpose of this study is to understand the planning, preparedness, and responses
of island states to oil spills and examine what are the challenges faced, and explore
how to address those challenges using the case study of the mv Wakashio oil spill.
1.3 Research Questions
International frameworks and regulations are in place to prevent oil spill incidents, and
there are also regimes for oil pollution damage compensation. Most states have fully
complied with all these frameworks and the regimes. However, when oil spills happen,
states are struggling to manage them and face a lot of consequences, especially the
small states.
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(i) What are the challenges faced by small island developing states in planning,
preparedness, and response to oil spills?
(ii) What was the experience of Mauritius consequent to the mv Wakashio oil spill?
(iii) What are the lessons learnt from the mv Wakashio oil spill?
1.4 Motivation
Fishing and tourism are some of the main factors in the island state's GDP. If any major
oil spills happen, then it directly affects the island state's economy. The researcher,
being a citizen of an island state that is very close to one of the major SLOCs in the
Indian Ocean, has been seeing that large numbers of ships are passing daily very close
to the coastal area that carries fuel as cargo and as bunkers. Therefore, the country is
always exposed to a huge risk of oil spill incidents. Being an island state requires
examining the planning, preparedness, and response to such oil spills. Therefore, the
researcher was motivated to do the case study on the bulk carrier MV Wakashio which
ran aground off Mauritius early in the evening of 25 July 2020 since Mauritius Island
also has similarities with the researcher’s island.

6

2.0 Literature Review
This chapter discussed the literature review of planning and preparedness for oil spills,
as well as the contingency plan and the response to the oil spills. Then they discussed
the previous three oil spills in island states, because this study is about the preparedness
and response of the island states. After that, this chapter discussed the impacts of the
oil spills on the environment and socioeconomic aspects in brief. Finally, they
discussed compensation and liabilities and the few international instruments on oil
spills.
2.1 Planning and Preparedness for oil spills
When preparing to deal with any disasters or emergencies, planning and preparedness
are two of the most important phases to consider. It is the combined effort of various
stakeholders with their different roles. This literature review discussed the importance
of planning and preparedness for oil spills and what key factors should be considered
when planning and preparing and contingency planning for oil spill management.
According to (Alexander, 2015), the emergency plan has to be a living document and
it should not be restricted to a desk drawer without being used or updated. He
suggested that every six-month plan should be checked and do the necessary updates.
Even though ITOPF (2014) also highlighted the importance of review and updating of
the plans, according to them, plans should be actively managed, updated, and regularly
reviewed, for example, based on lessons learned from actual events or exercises, or in
accordance with changes in regulations.
According to (Li et al., 2016), a contingency plan is a set of instructions that describe
the steps to take before, during, and after an emergency, and this oil spill contingency
plan helps minimize potential hazards to human health and the environment by
ensuring a timely and coordinated response. As Jenkins (2000) highlighted, when
developing an oil spill plan, the first step in assessing the impact of a potential accident
is to define all the catastrophic levels of accidental spills that must be considered, and
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the next step is to consider the potential impact of such disasters. Even though ITOPF
(2014) also mentioned the same idea, the scope of the plan is determined by the risk
of spills in the geographic area covered by the plan. However, as per IPIECA (2015),
the degree of complexity involved in the planning process largely depends on the type
of operation, local conditions, and environmental and socio-economic sensitivities. It
is very important to pay attention to the environment and the socio-economic aspects
when planning, because oil spills cause a lot of damage to the environment and the
socio-economics of society. Issa & Vempatti (2018), Walker (2014), and Liu & Wirtz
(2009) have talked about the impact of oil spills on people, including health, society,
economy, usage, and culture in a wide range of entities of various sizes.
When preparing a plan for the oil spill, it involves various stakeholders. According to
OPRC 1990 Article 6 (1 b), "a national contingency plan for preparedness and
response which includes the organizational relationship of the various bodies involved,
whether public or private, taking into account guidelines developed by the
Organization" The effective response to the oil spill depends to a large extent on the
preparations of relevant organizations and individuals. Alexander (2015) has
mentioned that the emergency plan is to be shared among the participants and
stakeholders, which specifies their tasks and responsibilities. Quarantelli (1998) also
mentioned that sharing information by organizing regular meetings with stakeholders
and forming informal linkages between stakeholders should be part of disaster
planning. As per the ITOPF (2014), to work together as a coherent team, all responders
must understand the plan and be familiar with their own roles and the roles of others
in the response structure. Therefore, it is very essential for every stakeholder to know
their duties and responsibilities as well as other stakeholders’ duties and
responsibilities. If not during the emergency, there will be a lot of misunderstandings
among the stakeholders. Conducting regular exercises and training programmes will
help.
In a nutshell, planning and preparedness are one of the most important phases to be
considered when preparing to address any contingency. When preparing the plan, there
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are a few aspects to consider. Those include risk assessment and defining all the
catastrophic levels of the spills. Stakeholder engagement is another important element
in the contingency plan, and understanding each other's roles and responsibilities will
result in an effective response to the oil spill.
2.2 Response to oil spills
The response to an oil spill is a dynamic, time-sensitive, diverse, and complex process
with numerous limits and problems. This literature review explains the aims of the
response to oil spills, what factors are to be considered, and the challenges that come
with responding to oil spills.
Firstly, the oil spill response aims to minimize the damage to the environment. Hardy
(2013) and Tierney (1993) state that emergency planning and response activities can
reduce injuries, save lives, reduce property damage, reduce secondary hazards, reduce
environmental impact, and allow the resume of normal operations more quickly. Steele
et al., (2001) also talked about a similar idea to Hardy (2013), but it is more specific
to oil spills, and his idea of oil spill response aims to minimize damage and reduce the
time for environmental recovery.
As per the US Department of Commerce, the oil spill response goals are to ensure the
safety of human life, stabilize the situation to preclude it from worsening (e.g., source
control, on-water recovery) and minimize adverse environmental and socio-economic
impacts.
According to the review of disaster preparedness of Tierney (1993), disaster response
activities are actions taken when the disaster occurs (or prior to impact, if the event is
predicted or forecasted), aimed at reducing threats to life safety, secondary hazards,
and losses caused by the event. These include warning, evacuation, protection of life
and property, search and rescue, caring for the wounded, providing emergency shelters
for victims, damage assessment, debris removal, and other activities that occur during
the emergency period after the impact.
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The response to an oil spill is a dynamic, time-sensitive, diverse, and complex process
with numerous limits and problems. According to Sheppard (2019), the quantity and
quality of the spilled oil, the location of the spill, the environmental and weather
conditions, and the availability of response strategies are factors that affect the
consequences of responses. Zhong & You (2011) mentioned the similar idea of
Sheppard (2019), and in addition, they have highlighted the importance of
coordination of coastal protection activities, legal constraints, and performance
degradation with bad weather. Response activities are frequently hampered by a
limited time frame and poor decisions, which can jeopardize oil recovery efficiency
and waste resources (Sheppard, 2019). During any major oil spill, a lot of coordination
and planning are required. For instance, over 39,000 personnel, 5000 vessels, and 110
aircraft have been involved in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response and over 700
km of booms have been deployed; 275 controlled burns have been carried out (Zhong
& You, 2011). According to the IOGP Report 520, the elements that are critical for a
successful response include having a strong Incident Management System (IMS) in
place, as well as a strong stakeholder engagement program, to guarantee that
appropriate authorities and communities support the planned plans and tactics in the
event of a spill. Furthermore, having a good understanding of the tiered preparedness
and response concept along with the spill impact mitigation assessment process by the
stakeholders is also key to a successful response.
Grubesic et al. (2017) discussed a response model which has two elements: strategic
planning and tactical response. The strategic element related to the issue of oil spill
response focuses on where to find sufficient human resources and equipment for
effective oil spill response. These decisions must be made before the oil spill, which
means that planners must rely on probabilistic information about the location,
frequency, scale, and duration of the oil spill. The second element focuses on tactical
or operational decisions related to the response to the oil spill. These decisions were
made after the leak

occurred and

must

include the location of the

transportation/equipment location, the best combination of equipment for the leak.
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As per Ornitz & Champ (2002), in the operational decision-making process for oil spill
response, a wide range of issues and activities have to be considered, and these include
the nature of the spilled materials, which alter in physical and chemical properties and
biodegrade over time, local environmental conditions, the sensitivity of impacted
natural resources, and the selection and efficacy of response/clean-up solutions.
According to Hook et al. (2016), some understanding of the characteristics and
behavior of VLSFO is essential for planning, responding, cleaning up, and determining
the extent of damage, as well as recovering from an accidental release. As per Scarlett
et al., (2021), the m.v Wakashio spill is the first recorded VLSFO since the
implementation of the IMO regulations, which is mainly released into the
environment.
The oil spill response aims to minimize the damage to the environment, ensure safety
of human life and reduce the socio-economic impacts. The response to an oil spill is a
dynamic, time-sensitive, diverse, and complex process with numerous limits and
problems. The quantity and quality of the spilled oil and the location of the spill are
two important factors during the oil spill response. For an effective oil spill response,
a good decision-making process and coordination are two essential factors.
2.3 Bunker spills in Island States
This literature review discussed only a few oil spills that occurred in small island
states, because this study has mainly focused on oil spills in small island states.
2.3.1 Bunker spill in the Solomon Island 2019
The Solomon Islands sea area is one of the richest marine biodiversity areas in the
world and has one of the world’s most important coral reef systems, home to 485 coral
species and 1,019 fish species (Kessler, 2019). On 5th February 2019, Hong Kongflagged bulk carrier MV Solomon Trader ran aground spilling heavy fuel across
coastal areas and sensitive coral reef system at Kangava Bay, Rennell Island. The
vessel’s grounding caused extensive damage to its hull and fuel tanks, which were
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carrying some 700 metric tons (772 tons) of oil (Kessler, 2019). The Solomon Islands
requested assistance from Australia for managing the oil spill (Kessler, 2019).
Solomon Islands is a part of PACPLAN (Pacific Islands Regional Marine Spill
Contingency Plan) which provide the framework for cooperative regional responses
to major marine spills in the Pacific Islands region and under PACPLAN, Australia
has been allocated as the primary source of assistance to the Solomon Islands
(ITOPF,2019).
A team comprising of local and international experts carried out an environmental
damage assessment four months after the spill, and it was estimated at around $51
million (Fox, 2020). However, the Solomon Island adopted the Bunker convention
into their national legislation in 2021 as per the IMO database and they were not part
of the Bunker Convention when the oil spill incident occurred.
2.3.2 Bunker spill in Mauritius 2016
The Liberian flagged vessel mv Benita ran aground along the coast of Le Bouchon off
the southeast of the Mauritius Islands on 17 June 2016 while on route from India to
South Africa. When the incident happened, the ship was carrying around 145 metric
tons (MT) of fuel oil and 30 MT of diesel. Soon after the grounding, anti-pollution
booms were placed around the vessels with dedicated teams to collect and remove any
oil that had accumulated (Schuler, 2016). A salvage company was at the site with less
time and was able to pump out all the fuel on board, resulting in only a very minor oil
spill. Further, they were able to tug out the vessel from the grounding location. With
the mv Benita incident, the Mauritius authorities were much more aware of the risk
and had an elaborate planning tool, and they gained experience in oil spill management
(Beguer, 2020).
2.3.3 Bunker spill in Papua New Guinea 2012
The Japanese-owned refrigerated cargo ship mv Asian Lily ran aground on Kwaiawata
Island in the Milne Bay Province of Papua New Guinea on 24th December 2012 and
the fuel oil had spread along approximately 115 meters of the island's coastline
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(Wilson, 2013). Milne Bay contains a high diversity of corals and marine life,
including more than 1,000 species of fish, 630 species of molluscs, and 360 species of
hard coral, as well as seagrasses and mangrove forests. Kwaiawata Island is a small
island that has a population of around 300 people and fisheries play a central role in
the socio-economic existence of the people of the island (Reynolds, 2014). Seventy
percent of the island's households rely on fishing and other marine resources for
subsistence (Wilson, 2013). There was more damage done to the coral reef and marine
ecosystem by the mv Asian Lily due to the long delayed response to the incident by
the authorities, as per Wilson (2013). However, when there is an oil spill in a remote
area, it is very difficult to respond the same way as in non-remote areas. During this
incident, there was no helicopter landing site or any tracks or pathways appropriate for
transporting equipment across the island (Reynolds, 2014). Therefore, effective and
reasonable response methods are mainly dependent on the available resources. Due to
the logistical constraints, rag wiping was used as opposed to other more equipmentfocused techniques (Reynolds, 2014). In an oil spill, response, health, and safety
remain very important factors throughout the response operation, and during the
response in remote areas, the majority of the workers will be part of a local community
who are not fully aware of the international standards, safety measures, and health
measures. Therefore, it is important that those managing the response utilize their
experience to ensure that the relevant health and safety best practices are applied, and
those carrying out the work are sufficiently trained and briefed to do the task.
(Reynolds, 2014).
2.3.4 Overview of bunker spills in Island States
Some of the island states are rich in marine biodiversity especially their coral reef
systems and the livelihood of the people who lives in these coastal areas are mainly
dependant on fisheries and other marine resources for subsistence. Once an oil spill
has occurred, it affects the socio economy of the people. When there is an oil spills in
the island states they request the assistance of other countries. Some locations of the
oil spills occur in remote areas and when there is an oil spill in the remote area it is
very difficult to respond in the same way as in non-remote areas. Therefore, effective
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and reasonable response methods are mainly dependent on the availability of
resources.
2.4 International frameworks regarding oil spills preparedness and response
There are mainly two international legal systems that deal with marine pollution, the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions. These frameworks have been put in place
to prevent, reduce and control environmental pollution and as compensation for
damage caused by pollution. In this literature, the researcher discussed few
international instruments which are more relevant to the mv Wakashio incident.
2.4.1 UNCLOS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that
according to Part XII of UNCLOS Article 192, countries have general obligations to
protect and preserve the marine environment. Provisions related to the prevention,
reduction, and control of marine pollution from ships are given in Article 211 of
UNCLOS under the heading "Pollution from vessels". It explains that the States shall
establish international rules and standards to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of
the marine environment from vessels, and those rules and standards have to be reexamined from time to time. According to UNCLOS Article 235, states must provide
prompt and adequate compensation for damage to the marine environment caused by
pollution. Furthermore, it states that states should work together to implement existing
international law and further develop international law regarding the liability and
compensation process, as well as develop criteria and procedures for the payment of
adequate compensation.
2.4.2 IMO Conventions
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), being the competent international
organization, formulates the rules and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control the
pollution of ships in the marine environment and compensate for the damage caused
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by the pollution. With the initiatives of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO), predecessor of IMO, several international instruments were
introduced to prevent, reduce, and control the pollution of ships to the marine
environment. Some of them are the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) in 1954 (entered into force in 1958), the
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties in 1969 in response to the SS Torrey Canyon incident in 1967,
and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL) in 1973. Furthermore, in relation to the incident of the grounding of the
Exxon Valdez in 1990, in Alaska, which led to the adoption of the International
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC)
(entered into force in 1995) (Fujii & Higuchi, 2020).After the Torrey Canyon oil spill
incident, there was a requirement for victims of oil pollution incidents to be adequately
compensated for their losses (Lavelle & Asariotis, 2012).This led to the adoption of
the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969
CLC) and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971 Fund Convention). However,
these systems are limited to oil tankers, and with the increase in the number of oil
pollution incidents caused by vessels other than tankers, the International Convention
on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (Bunker Convention 2001) was
adopted in 2001 for compensation for oil pollution damage caused by vessels other
than oil tankers.
2.4.3 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation (OPRC)
The maritime disaster also shows that countries need to be prepared and equipped for
such incidents, and to respond quickly for a more efficient recovery and clean-up
operation to reduce potential pollution damage, and in some cases, reduce the resulting
costs (Lavelle & Asariotis, 2012). In July 1989, a conference of leading industrial
countries in Paris called on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop
new initiatives to minimize pollution from ships. This call was endorsed by the
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International Maritime Organization's General Assembly in November of the same
year, and work on a draft agreement to establish an international cooperation
framework to cope with catastrophic occurrences (IMO,2019). As a result of the
above, the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) was adopted in 1990 to set a framework for international
cooperation and mutual support in the preparation for and response to significant oil
pollution incidents. The following are few important features of the OPRC
Convention.


Each party is responsible for ensuring that ships have a shipboard marine
pollution emergency plan (Article 3 (1)(a)).



Each party shall require that operators of offshore units under its jurisdiction
have oil pollution emergency plans that are coordinated with the national
system (Article 3 (2)).



Each Party shall require that authorities or operators in charge of such sea ports
and oil handling facilities as it deems appropriate under its jurisdiction have oil
pollution emergency plans or similar arrangements that are coordinated with
the national system (Article 3 (3)).



Each party is required to report without delay any event on their ship or
offshore unit involving a discharge or probable discharge of oil (Article 4 (1)
(a)).



Each party is required to report without delay any observed event at sea
involving a discharge of oil or the presence of oil (Article 4 (1) (b)).



Each party shall establish a national system for responding promptly and
effectively to oil pollution incidents, and this system shall include, as a
minimum, the designation of the competent national authority or authorities,
the national operational contact point or points, and an authority which is
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entitled to act on behalf of the State to request assistance (Article 6 (1) (a) (i)
(ii) (iii)).


Each party shall establish a national contingency plan for preparedness and
response which includes the organizational relationship of the various bodies
involved, whether public or private, taking into account guidelines developed
by the organization (Article 6, (1) b).



Each party, within its capabilities either individually or through bilateral or
multilateral co-operation with the oil and shipping industries, port authorities
and other relevant entities, shall establish a minimum level of pre-positioned
oil spill combating equipment, a programme of exercises for oil pollution
response, and detailed plans and communication capabilities for responding to
an oil pollution incident (Article 6 (2) (i)(ii) (iii)).

In 2000, the OPRC convention was further developed to address international
cooperation in combating major incidents or threats of marine pollution with a specific
focus on hazardous and noxious substances, and a Protocol of the OPRC-HNS
Protocol was adopted in 2000.
2.5 Compensation and Liabilities
Oil transportation continues to be a high-risk activity, both for those involved in the
production and marketing of oil and for others in society (Soto-Onate & Caballero,
2017). The oil spill has brought enormous economic and environmental disasters, and
the biodiversity of the affected ecosystems has changed irreversibly. The first set of
conventions was formulated after the Torrey Canyon incident in 1967, which polluted
approximately 190 kilometers of the British coastline, and the total clean-up cost was
estimated at 3 million pounds (UNCTAD,2012). The unprecedented event was the
most destructive and costly maritime disaster to date, and led to the adoption of a
comprehensive legal framework to address the issue of liability and compensation for
oil pollution damage caused by the spill of oil from the tankers:
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(1) 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969
CLC)
(2) 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971 Fund Convention)
2.5.1 CLC 1969
The Civil Liability Convention established a strict liability system for tanker owners
and introduced mandatory liability insurance (Jacobsson, 1994). The CLC, came into
force in 1975 and specifies the first level of oil spill compensation for ships that
transport oil as cargo. It provides the responsibility of ship-owners for any damage
caused by oil pollution in the territory or territorial waters of Contracting States. CLC
69 is a revolutionary instrument, a breakthrough in maritime law, which changed
customs and practices forever. Together with its 1992 Protocol, the CLC is still the
main international instrument for managing and regulating civil liability for oil
pollution from ships caused by persistent oil. The ship should carry bulk persistent oil
as cargo. According to Faure & Hu (2006), the Convention provides for strict liability
for oil tanker owners who cause pollution, but in some cases, the owner’s liability is
limited.
2.5.2 Fund Convention 1971
Although the Civil Liability Convention of 1969 is a useful mechanism for ensuring
the payment of oil pollution damage compensation, it does not fully address all of the
legal, financial, and other problems presented during the meeting that resulted to the
CLC Convention's adoption. (IMO,2019). In 1971, at a conference in Brussels, the
International Fund for compensation for oil pollution damage was established and
it entered into force in 1978, which is the second level of compensation.
The fund was established on the basis of two main reasons. First, it was a common
understanding that the responsibility should not be taken exclusively by ship-owners
alone, but should be extended to interesting interests, i.e. petroleum companies, and
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second, it was necessary to guarantee compensation to those who suffer from damage
due to oil contamination in cases where the CLC coverage was insufficient or even
unattainable. The Fund Convention of 1971 was revised through protocols in 1984,
1992, and 2003, significantly increasing the amounts of compensation in the states that
chose to ratify it.
2.5.3 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC)
The Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, was adopted on
November 19, 1979, and came into force on December 1, 1986. It replaced the
International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of
Seagoing Ships, 1957 (IMO,2019). LLMC 1976 was later amended by the Protocol of
1996 and it increased the compensation limits. The aims of LLMC were to enable shipowners and others (including insurance companies) to limit their liability in a way that
can satisfy legal claims, provided that effective insurance or other financial guarantees
can be provided. The limit applies to two types of claims for loss of life or personal
injury and claims for property (such as damage to other ships, property, or port work).
As per the LLMC 1976, the limit was set at 333,000 SDR, with an additional amount
based on tonnage added to individual claims for ships not exceeding 500 tons. For
other claims, the liability limit under the 1976 Convention is 167,000 SDR (Special
Drawing Rights) plus an additional amount based on the tonnage of ships over 500
tons.
The Protocol of 1996 was adopted on May 2, 1996, and came into force on May 13,
2004. It increased the limits of the amount of compensation payable in the event of an
incident and also introduced a "tacit acceptance" procedure for updating the amounts.
According to the 1996 Protocol, the limit of liability for claims for loss of life or
personal injury is 2 million SDR, and the liability for property claims is 1 million SDR
for ships not exceeding 2,000 gross tons. In 2012, a set of new amendments were
introduced to the Protocol 1996 by a decision of the Legal Committee of IMO,
increasing the limits. It came into force on 8 June 2015. As per the new amendments,
the limits have increased from 2 million SDR to 3.02 million SDR for loss of life or
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personal injury on ships not exceeding 2,000 gross tonnages, and they have increased
from 1 million SDR to 1.51 million SDR for property claims for ships not exceeding
2,000 gross tonnages (IMO,2019).
2.5.4 Bunker Convention 2001
The adoption of the Bunker Convention is intended to ensure that persons who have
suffered damage due to oil spills can obtain adequate, timely, and effective
compensation when carried as fuel in ships' bunkers (IMO,2019). The convention
applies to damage caused in the territorial zones (including territorial waters) and the
exclusive economic zones of the contracting States and this convention provides a
separate instrument that covers only pollution damage. The convention was adopted
on 23rd March 2001 and entered into force on 21st November 2008. As of September
16, 2021, 102 states had ratified the convention, accounting for 95.08% of global
tonnage (IMO GSISI, 2021). The level of coverage must be equal to the limit of
liability

under

the

applicable

national

or

international

limitation

regime, but under no circumstances should it exceed the amount calculated under
the 1976 Convention on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims as amended
(ITOPF 2019). Table 3 shows the previous oil spills from non-tanker vessels and total
maximum liability was calculated, and the amount of compensation reduced. A key
requirement of this convention is that registered owners of ships need to maintain
compulsory insurance, and another key clause is the requirement for direct litigation,
which allows direct claims for pollution damage from insurance companies (IMO,
2019).
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Table 3: The amount of compensation for damages claimed for Oil spillage accidents
from non-tanker vessels (Source; Fujii & Higuchi, 2020)

When comparing the Bunker Convention with the CLC and Fund Conventions, the
Bunker Convention;


It has a different definition of oil.



There is no second tier ‘Fund’



Claims are not channeled only to the registered ship-owner;



It establishes no limits on its own liability.



The compulsory insurance requirement is set at 1,001GT and does not apply to
ships carrying a minimum of 2,000 tons of oil cargo.

The grounding of the MV Solomon Trader in February 2019, which spilled more than
300 tons of heavy fuel oil into Kagava Bay and the subsequent oil spill caused
significant environmental impacts and economic losses ranging from US $14 million
to US $38 million, triggered the accession of the government of Solomon Island to the
Bunkers Convention (Solomon Island Government,2021). At the time of the incident,
Solomon Island was not a party to the Bunker Convention 2001 and the convention
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entered into force on 15th February 2021. The government of Solomon Island has
started the process of pursuing owners and insurers for compensation arising from
pollution damages caused by MV Solomon Trader after it came into force (Herald,
2021) and according to the Article 8 of the Bunker Convention, a time limit for action
under the convention of 3 years from the date when the damage occurred and, in any
event, 6 years from the date of the incident which caused the damage.
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3.0 Methodology
In this chapter, the research methodology will be discussed and research methodology
is organized into the sections such as research design, data collection, participants,
interviews, data analysis, ethical issues, and limitations.
3.1 Research Design
This study used a case study approach to examine the oil spill preparedness and
response of the island states. According to Stake (1995), the case study method is used
as a research strategy, in which researchers explore in-depth plans, events, activities,
processes, or one or more individuals. The cases are limited by time and activities.
Researchers use various data collection procedures to collect detailed information over
a long period (Dodge, 2011). In this study, a single case study method was chosen to
study the mv Wakashio incident on Mauritius Island in July 2020.
A qualitative research method was used in this research based on both syntheses of
secondary information and primary data since the purpose of this study is to understand
the planning, preparedness, and responses of island states to oil spill responses and
what challenges are faced and how to best address those challenges. To study the oil
spill management of mv Wakashio, it was necessary to get the experience and
knowledge of people who were involved with it directly and indirectly. Otherwise, the
researcher has to depend on secondary data only. In general, qualitative research
methods are particularly useful in discovering the meaning that people give to events
they experience (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Further, the
qualitative research method allows events to be described based on the participants’
perspectives, and provides a way to explore multiple realities, and stimulate an overall
understanding of the phenomena investigated (Young et al., 2018).
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3.2 Data Collection
3.2.1 Primary Data Collection
Qualitative research, interviews are the most widely used technique for collecting
primary data (Young et al., 2018). To collect primary data, a total of 11 semi-structured
interviews were conducted, including interviews from stakeholders from government
officials, experts from other organizations, NGOs, journalists, and the local
community in Mauritius Island. In addition, a survey form was sent to 23 countries
that have not ratified the Bunker Convention 2001 to find the reasons for not ratifying
the convention.
3.2.2 Secondary Data Collection
Secondary data refers to data that has been collected for other purposes or refers to
data collected by someone other than the user (Allen, 2017). To collect secondary data
for this study scholarly articles about oil spills management, local and foreign
newspaper articles about the mv Wakashio incident, and few other oil spills incidents
in island states were referred to. Further, special attention was given to the article from
Lloyd’s List, Marine Pollution Bulletin and technical papers of ITOPF and few local
newspapers articles like Mauritius Times and international media like BBC and Al
Jazeera referred to gather the secondary data.
3.3 Participants
Selecting personnel to be interviewed for this study was a purposeful selection method,
and while selecting the interviewees, the researcher tried to select the people who were
mainly involved with the oil spill management and the expertise. The researcher
approached potential interviewees from Mauritius Island who were the stakeholders
in the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan, National Crisis Committee, and other
organizations. The researcher sent e-mails to 45 people in Mauritius Island requesting
an interview, but only two people responded, and others did not respond, apparently
due to the ongoing court process on the mv Wakashio. In addition, a few others
(personnel from the UN, IMO, ITOPF, NGOs, and journalists) who were directly
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involved in the oil spill management process of the mv Wakashio incident were
interviewed. In addition, to examine the preparedness and response of two other island
states, personnel in these states involved in oil spill management were also
interviewed.
3.4 Interviews
Eleven participants in total were interviewed for this research. All the participants who
are particularly knowledgeable about the oil spill contingency plan and management
and articulated their knowledge, and insights which can help assist an observer in the
understanding event of the mv Wakashio incident. The participants were interviewed
between 04th July 2021, and 18th August 2021. All interviews were conducted
through Zoom and social media (WhatsApp) and lasted 35 to 55 minutes. With the
consent of the participants, I recorded the interviews in audio/video to ensure accurate
transcription. I also took handwritten notes during each interview so that I could track
key points to review or highlight particularly interesting or important ideas later in the
interview. As the first step in the interview process, I reminded the participants of the
research purpose, research procedures, expected benefits, their right to withdraw from
the research at any time, and the protection of confidentiality. I also provided
information about myself and the WMU master's program to build a relationship and
earn their trust. I used a semi-structured interview method and the questions guide was
approved by the WMU Research Ethics Committee. Open-ended questions were used
throughout the interview to encourage participants to answer questions freely and
openly. I used follow-up questions when necessary to encourage participants to
formulate or clarify answers and to get more information. After every interview, the
transcription process began. Therefore, the primary data was collected through the
semi-structured interview method (see Table 4).
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Table 4: Details of interviews

3.5 Data Analysis
The analysis of primary data was done by using the thematic analysis method. All of
the interviews were transcribed, and a considerable number of codes were generated.
The codes were then combined and mixed to create main themes. Different
respondents' perspectives on that particular topic were obtained. The themes are
divided into two parts which are risks and stakeholders. Risks associated with the
planning and preparedness to the oil spill and stakeholders associated in response to

26

the oil spill and national and international frameworks. Under the theme of risk,
analysis of the oil spill incident, predicted risk and unpredicted risks were carried out
where as in stakeholder’s theme, stakeholders response and stakeholders who were
affected by the oil spill were analysed and future plans and recommendations were
discussed.
3.6 Ethical Consideration
The interviews and sending out survey forms were commenced only after obtaining
approval from the WMU Research Ethics Committee (REC). As an ethical
consideration, the informed consent form was sent to all the participants to read,
understand and sign before commencing the interviews. The interview data protection
process is another ethical consideration in this study and it was in line with the
university guidelines. The research data is stored on the researcher’s personal
computer with password protection. Confidentiality is another ethical consideration in
this study that protects the identity of the participants. To protect the identity of the
participants, their names are not mentioned and they will be anonymous in the
research, and respondents are named R1, R2, R3, and so on.
3.7 Limitations
During any oil spills, there will be many sectors to discuss but this study was limited
to planning and preparedness to the oil spills by island states and few discussions about
the environmental and socio-economic impact from the oil spills. The timeframe,
budget constraints, and COVID-19 pandemic to travel around to collect data were
other limitations of this study. Data gathering through the interview was one of the
difficult tasks during the study and the researcher had sent nearly 45 emails to the
people who were involved with the mv Wakashio incident in Mauritius and only two
people responded. Despite best efforts, the interview could not be secured with any
one from the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan committee and the National Crisis
Committee of Mauritius. Further, the limited response to other interview requests also
materialised only after sustained perseverance.
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4.0 Case study of the mv Wakashio
4.1 Introduction
Mauritius, Rodriguez, Agalega, Tromelin, Cargados Carajos (St. Brandon), and the
Chagos Islands, including Diego Garcia, make up the Republic of Mauritius, which is
located in the Indian Ocean. Mauritius' main island is located in the south-western
Indian Ocean, roughly 2,000 kilometres east of Africa's east coast and 855 kilometres
east of Madagascar.

Figure 2: Location of Mauritius Islands (Source: NBSAP 2006 ‐ 2015)
Mauritius is situated between the southern tip of Africa and the northern entrance to
the Strait of Malacca, which connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and it is the
preferred route between the large markets and manufacturing centers of China, Japan,
South Korea, and other parts of East Asia, and the resource-rich regions of West Africa
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and Latin America, or the markets of Eurozone (Lee,2020). On 25th July 2020, a 300
m Japanese bulk carrier mv Wakashio sailing from China to Brazil ran aground on the
coral reef near on the southeast coast of Mauritius (Seveso et al., 2021).
4.2 Ship’s particulars
Built in 2007, the mv Wakashio was a Cape Size Bulk Carrier (Explainer,2020).
According to the IMO GSIS, it had a carrying capacity of 203130 DWT, a draught of
8.7 meters, a length overall (LOA) of 299.95 meters, a width of 50 meters, and was
built with a double hull. The ship was registered in Panama and had the IMO number
9337119. It was owned by a Japanese company.
4.3 Incident
The mv Wakashio left port Lianyungang, China on 4th July 2020 was bound for
Tubarao, Brazil, and no cargo, but having 3,800 tons of Low-Sulphur fuel oil and 200
tons of diesel on board (Mitsui-O.S.K.Lines, 2020). On 25th July 2020 when the ship
was navigating near the coast of Mauritius, it suddenly ran aground on a coral reef of
Blue Bay (Maritime Investigation Department,2021). The causes for the grounding of
the ship have not been discussed in this study since the study is focused on the
management of oil spills. However, two preliminary investigation reports have been
published by the MOL1 and the flag sate (Panama) of the mv Wakashio (Maritime
Affair Investigation Department, 2001). The day after the incident, the Mauritius

government activated the National Oil Spill Contingency plan (NOSCP) since the
location of the grounding (see Figure 3) was close to a marine park, two internationally
protected wetland sites of international importance (under the Ramsar Convention on

1

https://www.mol.co.jp/en/pr/2020/20090.html
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Wetlands 1971, as amended in 1987)2 including a small coral atoll hosting endemic
species of Mauritius’ rich and rare biodiversity and a popular tourist
destination(UNCTAD,2020).

Figure3: Location of mv Wakashio (Source https://www.fleetmon.com/maritimenews/2020/30533/major-oil-spill-mauritius-island/)
Due to bad weather conditions, the first signs of cracks in the hull were reported on
August 5th and, shortly thereafter, oil began to leak. However, it was a minor oil slick
and the authorities assumed that NOSCP was still sufficient since the risk of the oil
spill was low (Saini, 2020). After the 5th of August, the vessel began flooding and

2

https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/library/the_ramsar_convention
_in_international_law.pdf
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sinking, and the Prime Minister, Pravind Jugnauth, declared a national environmental
emergency, fearing huge damage to the environment and the economy (Anna, 2020).
According to the Minister of Environment, Solid Waste Management and Climate
Change, around 400 booms had been deployed to protect sensitive areas, and a
command post had been established to monitor the situation (OCHA,2020). By the
10th of August, around 1000 tons of oil had been spilled and the oil slick had expanded
(see Figure 4) to almost ten times its original size since the vessel first started leaking
heavy oil into the coastal waters on August 6th, 2020 (Degnarain, 2021). The minister
of fisheries stated that ‘the country is experiencing this kind of disaster for the first
time and is not in a position to manage the situation with the available equipment’ and
requested international assistance (Saini, 2020).
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Mahebourg

Pointe d’ Esny

Blue Bay

Figure 4: Potential oil observed at the surface of the Pointe d'Esny reef on 10th August
2020 (Source UNITAR,2020)
France sent a military aircraft with pollution control equipment from its nearby island
of Reunion to help deal with the spill in Mauritius, while Japan sent a team of six to
assist Mauritius in its efforts (Khadka, 2020). The Indian Government had provided
technical support on environmental and pollution control and clean-up (OCHA,2020).
Table 5 illustrate the equipment brought by the countries to assist Mauritius during the
mv oil spill.
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Table 5: Equipment received from other countries (Source; BBC,2020; Sandhu,
2020)

Nearly 3000 tons of fuel were removed from the ship with the help of helicopters and
another two vessels (MT Elise and MT Tresta Star) by 12th August (Nagashiki
Shipping Co., LTD., 2020). Due to the bad weather and the rough sea, the mv
Wakashio broke into two parts with nearly 166 tons of fuel on-board. IMO announces
it has deployed an expert, jointly with the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), to support the Government of Mauritius by
providing technical advice on issues related to oil spill response. Salvage and cleanup efforts were hampered by the high winds with waves of five meters high (Bakhsh,
2020). The re-floating operation of the forward part of the hull was completed on
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August 19th, 2020, and NGO Greenpeace warned of the severe environmental
consequences after the government decided to sink the front part of the vessel.
However, operations to sink the forward part of the ill-fated vessel were completed,
despite

environmental

concerns.

The

local

population,

non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) (See Table 6), and community service groups responded
quickly and actively participated in restricting the spread of oil spills in different ways,
using different manual methods to control the spill and remove oil from the sea surface
and along the coast (Seveso et al., 2021).
Table 6: NGOs participation during the mv Wakashio incident (Source; Author from
interviews)

Hundreds of Mauritian citizens hurriedly set up temporary barriers with sacks filled
with straw and other materials to control the leakage (Edmunds, 2020).
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Figure: 5 Local populations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community
service groups rigging and deploying artisanal booms
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/mauritius-residents-join-efforts-contain-oilspill-grounded-ship-splits-n1236868
Thousands of people demonstrated in Mauritius over the government’s handling of the
incident (Vyawahare, 2020), and the people started by asking the decision makers to
be held accountable for their late response when they got stuck on the ship and the
general handling of the disaster (Raghoo,2021). MOL announced that it will provide
long-term contributions to the environment and the society of Mauritius with the
support and cooperation of experts and organizations with specialized knowledge in
environmental restoration and protection, working closely with the government of
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Japan (MOL,2020). Nagashiki Shipping, a Japanese ship-owner, has appointed
Lianyungang Dali Underwater Engineering, a Chinese salver, to begin removal
operations on the ship's stern on November 5th, 2020. (See Appendix “A” for the time
lines of the mv Wakashio incident).
4.4 Environmental Impacts
The grounding of the mv Wakashio happened in an environmentally sensitive and
biodiverse area off the east coast of Mauritius (UNCTAD,2020). The Blue Bay Marine
Park was declared as a marine protected area and designated a marine park in year
2000 and it was officially nominated as the second internationally important wetland
in Mauritius (Ramsar Wetland) in year 2008 (CHM,2015). The oil spill in Mauritius
affected sensitive ecosystems, such as mangrove forests. Since the mangrove forest is
a hotbed of the marine environment, the consequences for marine life can be disastrous
(Seveso et al., 2021). The Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) team observed no direct impact
on coral and mangroves in the sites of Blue Bay Marine Park, but they observed
turbidity that occurred near the touchdown point, which is believed to be caused by
fine carbonate particles produced by broken coral, and they also reported oil pollution
in the mangroves, especially near the mouth of the Riviera des Creoles (Toyoshima et
al., 2020). 51 melon-headed dolphins were washed away near the coast of Mauritius
in the same area where the oil spill occurred, but no traces of hydrocarbons were found
on the animals' skin, digestive tract, or respiratory tract (Seveso et al., 2021). The
government of Mauritius established different professional working groups, composed
of government officials, university researchers, NGOs, and foreign scientists,
especially scientists from Japan and scientists from the United Nations (UN), to initiate
coordinated preliminary ecological monitoring shortly after the disaster (Seveso et
al.,2021).
4.5 Socioeconomics Impacts
In Mauritius, the blue economy has been identified as one of the pillars of its economic
development, leading to its transformation into a high-income economy by 2025 (V.N
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& Narnia, 2018). Mauritius’ blue economy is currently represented by coastal tourism,
fisheries, seafood processing and port activities, which are also regarded as traditional
marine activities. Except for coastal tourism, these activities account for 10.5% of the
gross domestic product (GDP) and employ approximately 7,000 people (Nairobi
Convention Secretariat,2019). Mauritius’s tourism industry is reportedly a popular
destination for its pristine beaches, which contributed approximately US $ 1.6 billion
to its economy in year 2019 and has been negatively affected by COVID-19
(UNCATAD,2020). The spill has happened during the ongoing fragility caused by the
coronavirus pandemic and there was no tourism during that time. However, spill could
negatively impact tourism in the long term.
Fisheries and aquaculture are an important part of the Mauritius economy, accounting
for about 1.5% of the gross domestic product, employing 22,000 people, including the
provision of fish processing and services for the fishery sector (Raffaello & Lucio,
2017). There are 2200 registered fishermen who engage with artisanal fishing (Lalliee
et al 2018) in Mauritius and among them there are 630 fishermen in southeast coast of
Mauritius. The daily income of the artisanal fisherman was MUR 300 per day
(Soondron,2010) and the government of Mauritius declared the area from Trou d`Eau
Douce to Le Bouchon ban on fishing, swimming and all other marine activities on 28th
August 2020(Mauritius Government Information Service,2020). The government of
Mauritius has been paying MUR 5100 monthly for registered fishermen who were
affected from the oil spill (Ighobor, 2021). According to UNDP’s Resident
Representative for Mauritius and Seychelles "One of the findings was that the spill
directly affected approximately 48,000 Mauritians living in 17 coastal villages along
the 30 km shoreline".
4.6 Compensation and Liabilities
Since Wakashio is not a tanker, for the compensation regime, the Civil Liability
Convention 1992 and the IOPC Fund Convention 1992 are not applicable and any
compensation claims seem likely to be dealt with under the 2001 Bunker Convention.

37

Mauritius is a party to the 2001 Bunker Convention, which establishes the strict
liability of ship-owners for damage caused by fuel oil pollution (IMO,2020). However,
as per Article (6) of the Bunker Convention 2001, the amount of liability may be
limited in accordance with any applicable national or international regime, such as
the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC), 1976, as
amended in 1996. Mauritius is part of LLMC 76, which sets the limit of liability for
property damage and pollution claims covered in the MV Wakashio case at US $18
million (IMO,2020). The lower limit of approximately US $18 million is hardly
enough to make up for the estimated loss due to the impact of approximately 1,000
tons of heavy fuel oil on the unspoiled ecological environment in Mauritius (Hall,
2020). The researchers could not find any fully completed assessment on clean-up
costs and pollution damage from the oil spill, but according to Osler, (2020), the
impact on the fishing and tourism sectors will be more expensive. According to MI
News Network, the ship owner has agreed to pay US $25,000 to 50 fishermen in total
as compensation for the loss of livelihood in the area. Initially, Mauritius requested
US $34 million for the clean-up process, but the P & I Club of Japan promised to
provide US $9 million over the next few years to accelerate the clean-up of oil spills
and restore marine life and the environment. Further, MOL has established the "MOL
Charitable Trust" (the Trust) in the Republic of Mauritius on 21st June 2021 as part of
its benevolent and philanthropic actions to support activities for the public benefit of
Mauritius and its people to address the impacts of the oil spill. It is a total of 800
million yen (US $7.2 million) fund (MOL,2021).
4.7 National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP) of Mauritius
The National Oil Spill Response Plan (NOSCP) was developed in 1990 to identify
potential resources, equipment, and personnel to respond to future oil spills. In 1986,
the Government of Mauritius sought help from the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to help
develop the Mauritius National Contingency Plan (NOSCP,1990). In order to solve
various

environmental

problems

and
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effectively implement

NOSCP,

the

Environmental Protection Act was promulgated in 2002, with independent attention to
NOSCP (Belal & Jain, 2020). The NOSCP was revised and updated between 1998 and
2002, when the World Bank provided funding for the Western Indian Oil Spill
Contingency Project to the island nations of the Indian Ocean Commission and
provided necessary equipment and materials, such as oil booms, floating tanks,
absorbents, dispersants, skimmer pumps, etc., and most importantly, training for the
stakeholders of NOSCP (Prayag, 2020).
The NOSCP is linked to contingency plans developed by Port Louis, the resident oil
company, and the National Disaster Management Plan and all of these plans can be
combined with NOSCP, depending on the location and size of the oil spill
(ITOPF,2021). According to the NOSCP, the Director of the Environment Department
of the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development is the Director of
NOSCP. If a spill occurs within the port boundary, the port master of the Mauritius
Port Authority (MPA) will assume the role of On Scene Coordinator (OSC PORT).
If the spill occurs outside the scope of the port authority or oil company and in the
Exclusive Economic Zone, the NOSCP director assumes overall control. The
Commandant of the National Coast Guard (Police Department) will be the On Scene
Coordinator for operations at sea and the Commanding Officer of the Special Mobile
Force will be On Scene Coordinator for inland waters (NOSCP,1990). The On-Scene
Coordinator will be assisted by three advisory teams (SAT, SOCAT, and SFAT),
which will provide relevant assessments in the scientific, socioeconomic, and
operational aspects of the response. NOSCP consists of a three-tier approach, and Tier
1 means any spill up to 10 MT will be dealt with using locally owned resources.
Tire 2 spills are classified as 100 MT and will be managed by the National Oil Spill
Response Team, which may be supported by regional resources. Any spill exceeding
100 MT is classified as Tier 3 and may require international help.
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4.8 Conclusion
The MV Wakashio ran aground on a coral reef in Blue Bay on July 25, 2020, when
the ship was navigating near the coast of Mauritius. On 26th of July 2020, the Mauritius
government activated the National Oil Spill Contingency plan and several booms had
been deployed to protect sensitive areas, and a command post had been established to
monitor the situation. The Mauritius government requested international assistance
and France, India, Japan and Australia provided the response equipment with experts.
The local population and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) responded quickly
and actively participated in the response process. The oil spill affected sensitive
ecosystems, such as mangrove forests, and the government has established different
professional working groups to initiate coordinated preliminary ecological monitoring
shortly after the disaster. The spill directly affected approximately 48,000 Mauritians
and the ship owner, P&I club, and MOL agreed to pay compensation.
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5.0 Data Analysis and Discussion
5.1 Chapter Introduction
This chapter analyses the status of preparedness and response to the oil spills by the
small island states, the response of international frameworks and regimes contribute
to react to the oil spills and the lessons learnt from this disastrous incident.
5.2 Experience of Mauritius to the mv Wakashio oil spill
Under this, researcher expects to analyse what actually happened in MV Wakashio oil
spill and gap of knowledge and preparedness in addressing the incident.
5.2.1 Analysis of mv Wakashio oil spill incident
Emergency Phase
The first major oil spill incident that happened on the Mauritius coastline was the first
major oil spill incident during the global pandemic COVID-19. Also, it can be
regarded as the first major spill of very Low-Sulphur fuel oil. According to the IPCC,
"the ongoing oil pollution incident from the grounded 203,000 DWT bulk carrier mv
Wakashio" is threatening an ecological catastrophe around the Indian Ocean island of
Mauritius, endangering corals, fish, and other marine life already under threat from
climate change" (IPCC 2020). The interviewees discuss how the emergency phase,
project phase, and contingency plan were carried out during the incident.
The IMO (International Maritime Organization) special representative to Mauritius for
the Wakashio incident explained in his interview an important perspective in
responding to oil spill incidents by smaller states. According to him, the difference is
in how much effort and time the nation can put into planning, buying equipment, and
initial tier one response during the emergency phase. In addition, he mentioned that
the risks of oil spills not only come from ships arriving at the port but also from all the
ships passing through the territorial sea. Furthermore, he mentioned that a contingency
plan is about educating people, not running drills or exercises. Also, he mentioned that
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appointing a talented individual who can run a fast-moving dynamic incident response
is vital for the whole operation. He complimented Saudi Arabia's commercial oil spill
plan, which within short notice arrived at the incident location fully equipped with all
the communication means, including the internet and satellite, and with innovative and
modern big printers and scanners, everything a response team would need3.
An officer from the National Coast Guard of Mauritius expressed his experience
during the emergency phase of the Wakashio Oil Spill Incident. The plan was activated
right from day one, since the grounding of the ship on July 25th, 2020. Immediate
actions were taken to protect the most sensitive eco-areas around the incident. The
NCG deployed booms to protect the Blue Bay Marine Park and the Pointe Jerome
Wetlands, which are classified as Ramsar sites. It is worthwhile, according to the
officer, to mention that the above measures were taken despite the fact that there were
no oil spills at that time and that the reports which the National Crisis Committee was
receiving on a daily basis mentioned that the risk of oil spill was low (from the Salvage
Masters). The spill occurred on the night of August 5th, and operations to contain the
spilled oil commenced early the next morning. A company (Polyeco Co. Ltd.) was
appointed as the environmental arm of the P & I Club, but they were short of
appropriate equipment. Around 15.9 km of booms have been deployed at different
areas, namely Blue Bay Marine Park, Pointe d’Esny, Ile aux Aigrettes, Pointe Brocus,
Mahebourg Waterfront, near the wreck of the MV Wakashio, as well as at 4 rivers,
namely Rivière La Chaux, Rivière des Créoles, Rivière Champagne, and Grande
Rivière Sud, according to a statement delivered by the Honourable K. Ramano,
Minister of Environment, Solid Waste Management and Climate Change. According
to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
mv Wakashio had on board around 4200 metric tons (MT) of fuel for its own
consumption, including low-sulfur fuel oil (3894 MT), diesel (207 MT), and lubricant
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oil (90 MT). The barges were brought to shore, the oil pumped out in container lorries,
then transported to a depot for storage. The oil which has spread over the shores of the
South, Southeast and part of the East of the island has either surfed over the booms or
drifted due to changing tides and waves due to wind and current directions4. The
Washington Post emphasized that local authorities indicated that approximately 3000
MT of fuel was pumped out before the ship broke in two, whereas around 1000 MT
leaked into the sea. In addition, even by August 24th, 1122 tons of contaminated liquid
waste (oil mixed with seawater) and 792 tons of contaminated solids on the shore had
been carted away, as mentioned in the press release of the National Crisis Committee
on the same day. According to ITOPF, as of 11th August, "approximately 800-900 tons
of fuel oil had leaked from a breached tank and drifted into the lagoon surrounding
Pointe d’Esny; oil has also come ashore at various locations around the Baie de Grand
Port, including areas of mangrove. Other estimates indicate between 1,000 and 2,000
tons of fuel oil might have leaked from the ship into the environmentally sensitive
waters "(ITOPE, 2020). About 27 square kilometers of the island’s southeast coast are
affected by this ecological disaster.
In contrast, an activist who was interviewed for research gave a different perspective
on the incident, saying that the respective authorities and government hadn’t started
working for twelve days until the oil spill was recorded. The fuel started spreading
over the waters and down to the coast. And it started to accumulate, spreading to the
southeast region5.
Giving interviews for the research, contract workers and negotiators of the Mauritius
Ports Authority-Maritime Union and Other Staff Union (MPA-MAOSU) gave
different views. According to the interview, there was dynamic citizen mobilization,

4

Tenth Transcript

5

Fifth Transcript

43

but the Mauritius government had not taken the plan to mitigate the damage
effectively. According to him, the contingency plan was documented in the year 2008
and after that, oil spill response equipment had never been reviewed or maintained,
which was a huge issue during the emergency phase6.
Project Phase
The researcher interviewed the representative from ITOPF (International Tanker
Owners Pollution Federation) who started work on site after the end of the emergency
phase, starting in early September. "So I was the sort of second team on site for
Wakashio". The characteristic of the project phase is that most of the stakeholders have
estimated and assessed the impact of a catastrophe by then. In addition, how it differs
from the emergency phase is that the crisis meetings that would happen once a day or
twice a day have been reduced to bi-weekly during the project phase. Therefore, by
the project phase, all the parties associated are aware of techniques to exercise,
resources, and involved parties. The representative gives an overview of his job
description, and researchers find it essential to examine his job description in order to
understand his stance on incidents during the project phase. His role was to monitor
two contractors, Le Floch Depollution and Polyeco SA, assigned to cleaning different
parts of the shoreline, establish adequate information flow through communication
channels, brainstorm to mitigate damage, and feed back to the Mauritius government
and all the other stakeholders engaged7. Cleaning was being carried out by two
contractors under the supervision of the Solid Waste Management Division in nonsensitive areas and according to four stages, as stated by the Honourable K. Ramano,
Minister of Environment, Solid Waste Management, and Climate Change.
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(i) Disposal of accumulated/stacked waste oil and unused artisanal booms
(ii) Collection of contaminated debris, such as plastic bottles, wood, and other common
waste
(iii) Removal and washing of contaminated seaweed
(iv) Pressure washing contaminated rocks in confined spaces.
Contingency Plan
According to the Republic of Mauritius, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), National
Assembly on July 28th, 2020, the National Oil Contingency Plan was activated by the
Ministry of Environment, Solid Waste Management, and Climate Change on the day
of the ship’s grounding and oil booms were deployed, but on August 7th, the mv
Wakashio began leaking its bunker fuel.
According to the UNCTAD report, the government of Mauritius activated its national
oil spill contingency plan, declared a state of environmental emergency, and called for
international help. The stakeholder involvement in the planning is discussed in the
following paragraphs. In brief, aid was sent from a number of countries, including
France, India and Japan, as well as from international bodies, to help Mauritius deal
with the spill, such as: IMO, OCHA, the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), and the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF). The
Japanese owners and managers of the bulk carrier (Nagashiki Shipping), and its P&I
Club, contracted specialist oil response and salvage teams to help mitigate the effects
of pollution and the vessel’s time-charterers (Tokyo-Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.) also
pledged to cooperate and provide support.
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5.2.2 Analysis of Planned Risks Relating to the General Oil Spill Incident
Environmental Impact
It is inevitable that environmental hazards will be a major outcome of any oil spill
incident. This was true for Mauritius as well. The researcher takes the following
excerpt from the interview given to the media by Amanda Serumaga, UNDP’s
Resident Representative for Mauritius and Seychelles, regarding her view on
environmental impact. According to Serumaga, MV Wakashio grounded on 25 July
2020 and by 9 August 2020, an estimated 1,000 tons of oil had already spilled into the
south-eastern coastal waters at the coral reefs of Pointe d’Esny, home to key
biodiversity hotspots and hosts UNESCO Ramsar sites, just 400 m from the shore. The
disaster left an impact on lives and livelihoods and, more broadly, has negative
implications for the economy and the environment. According to conservationists, the
consequences of the oil spill on these eco-sensitive habitants and wetlands would take
years to reverse and revive. Therefore, UNDP collaborated with the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) to conduct an impact assessment, as part of the
broader UN emergency response that is coordinated by the Office of the UN Resident
Coordinator. One of the findings of the assessment was that the spill directly affected
approximately 48,000 Mauritians living in 17 coastal villages along the 30 km
shoreline8.
Compensation for Victims and Stakeholders
The IMO (International Maritime Organization) special representative to Mauritius for
the Wakashio incident was interviewed by the researcher for a pragmatic
understanding of risks, preparedness, and response related to the incident. While
explaining his job description, he insisted his role was to provide technical advice for
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the parties involved. He explained that while providing advice, it was essential to be
realistic. He also explained the claim forms and victim protection associated with
them9. According to the IMO (International Maritime Organization) special
representative to Mauritius for the Wakashio incident, in creating a claim form it is
essential to ask all the appropriate questions. He took examples from his experience at
Hebei Spill over South Korea and the Middle East.
As the UN representative explained in his interview, they have brought two specialists
to assist with the compensation process, but the government has not taken any help
from them.
During the interview of the activist, he mentioned that the compensation process is not
happening in the proper way and he said that "I heard that it's not trickling down to
the fishermen and I know that there are still a lot of unhappy people in the south right
now". Therefore, it is evident that the compensation process for the mv Wakashio has
not been progressing in favour of those who were affected by the oil spill.
However, according to literature, the ship owner has agreed to pay 25,000 USD to 50
fishermen in total as compensation for the loss of livelihood in the area, and the P & I
Club of Japan has promised to provide US $9 million over the next few years to
accelerate the clean-up of oil spills and restore marine life and the environment.
5.2.3 Comparison of Actual vs. Planned Risks of the MV Wakashio Oil Spill Disaster

Human Behaviour and Climatic Change
The Deputy Director of Shipping in Mauritius describes the reason behind the gap
between planned contiguous preparedness and actual real-time incident preparedness.
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The main reasons, in his opinion, stem from human behavior and climate conditions.
Unlike in a drill or practice, the panic associated with a real-life incident is
overwhelming, and weather conditions are usually neutral during a lifeboat drill or life
raft launch10.
Sulphur Fuel
A representative from ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation)
explained the weightage and gravity of the oil spill, which initially started with lowsulfur fuel oil. According to the representative, this prompted scientists to conduct a
scientific experiment to determine how the Sulphur oil might react in the environment.
It is important to note that any oil when you test in the lab versus when it actually
happens in a real-time environment, there is a significant gap. This is also evident in
the MV Wakashio Oil Spill. According to the interview, he regards that, unlike how it
was actually predicted, it turns out that in this case, the oil spill was really less viscous
than expected, mainly due to ambient temperature and tidal movements11.
Oil Spill Spread
A representative from ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation)
offered his view on trapped oil in the shoreline or that had sunk into the sediment on a
spring tide, washed back out, went up the shoreline again and spread oil into another
area of the shoreline. This was a significant problem during the emergency phase. In
addition, the shallow shoreline hinders booms from keeping track, resulting in the
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boom being ineffective or actually sitting on coral reefs, which are harmful to the
corals12.
Moreover, the IMO (International Maritime Organization) special representative to
Mauritius for the Wakashio incident explained in his interview, gave an example
where emergency phase decision making is crucial. He expressed that most of the time
in oil spill incidents, the oil is split into two parts. One part may be 1000 tons, and the
other part may be 100 tons. In this situation, most people mistakenly only care about
cleaning 1000 tons, but 100 tons might be spread into an eco-sensitive area or 100 tons
may be in somewhere that is easier to clean13. This was the case for MV.
Wakashio, UN satellites revealed 30 kilometers of shoreline along the coast of
Mauritius have been heavily affected by the heavier engine fuel oil leaked from the
Wakashio and EU’s own satellite analysis shows how the flow of oil changed from
Monday 10 August to Saturday 15 August, becoming more absorbed into the coastline
and many river estuaries on that part of the coast (Forbes, 2020).
COVID - 19
The ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation) representative stated
that the COVID-19 pandemic, social distancing, and quarantine rules associated with
it were the other major unforeseen threat. All the foreign officials who entered
Mauritius related to the Wakashio oil spill incident had to undergo PCR or antigen
tests and compulsory quarantine or self-isolation for two weeks, which added an extra
layer of challenge. Therefore, this incident taught every stakeholder to plan a
contiguous plan to operate under a global pandemic. There were not only resource
personnel and team delays due to COVID-19, but also equipment and machinery
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delays due to supply chain failure as a result of COVID 19 14. The Deputy Director of
Shipping Lines in Mauritius affirmed that the ineffective supply chain and lack of
manpower were due to COVID, whereas foreign vessels which arrived for aid had to
be isolated due to COVID protocols15.
The IMO (International Maritime Organization) special representative to Mauritius for
the Wakashio incident mentioned in his interview that the COVID-19 pandemic and
protocols associated with it affect the timeline and field visits in conducting
consultancies. Apart from self-isolation and quarantine, the team members arrived at
different times and each had to undergo quarantine, which affected the efficiency.
Lack of Accessibility to Shoreline
Another challenge that the team had to overcome during the response was access to
the shore, which is difficult from both inland and waterways. The reason is that the
shoreline is annexed by a big tidal lagoon which becomes shallow during low tide,
resulting in no access by boat to visit impacted islands. Therefore, the response
timeline always had to be on par with the tide timeframe. This becomes a grave issue
when sea water is contaminated by oil. During low tide, a vessel cannot get out or even
drag a boom was difficult as it caught up coral and broke itself, harming the coral
system16.
Ecosystem of Mangroves
A representative from ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation) who
started working on site during the project phase explained the unplanned risks of oil
spills and their effect on the environment. Mangroves are a group of trees and shrubs
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that live in the coastal intertidal zone. They are highly sensitive and the process of
cleaning them may cause more damage to the eco system. In relation to the Wakashio,
the representative affirmed that the most affected ecosystem is 40 kilometers width
mangroves. The representative added that the process of rejuvenating mangroves was
pretty much a trial and error, working with the private contractors and Mauritius
government to discover the most appropriate approach and trailing them and observing
to save the mangroves17. According to ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution
Federation) indications, clean-up operations may be delivered following a two-stage
process: first, the prompt removal of the gross contamination; and second, targeted
activities to limit the pollution damage and help the natural healing process.
The types of operational response guidelines based on actions and response strategies
for monitoring and restoring mangrove habitats impacted by large oil spills were well
developed as Standard Operational Procedures, responses, actions, and their timing
depended on four threat phases of the spill incident: "Pre-Spill", "During Spill PreImpact", "During Spill Post-Impact", and "Post Spill". For each phase, specific action
and monitoring plans are developed and suggested according to Duke (2016).
5.2.4 Analysing Future Risk in MV Wakashio and Mechanisms to Reduce Such Risks
The representative from ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation)
further explained to the researchers that, apart from the contingency plan, the real time
oil spill over is much different and full of surprises. He explained that the sign-off
phase would come after six months of clean-up response up to 1000 metric tons. The
Mauritius government played a critical role in mitigating the hazards and did very well
under all of those circumstances to get a response going because their borders were
closed. The main reasons for the successful clean-up procedure are the absence of
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centralized decision making in crisis response, the active role of the Mauritius Ministry
of Environment, and ensuring adequate information flow and transparency18.
The Professor from Copenhagen University participating in the research interview
mentioned that the contingency plan of Mauritius was not effective and it was not
followed accordingly, although the accident is well documented. Furthermore,
Mauritius has the responsibility as a nation where shipping lines have in their territorial
water. The higher the likelihood that an accident will occur, Therefore, coast guards
should play through all sorts of scenarios on a regular basis. In addition, he gave his
opinion on establishing a regional dialogue on pooling equipment for beach clean-up
when an oil spill accident occurs. So, there could be entities, according to him, such
as the Ocean Commission or the Southern African Development Community, which
could take the lead19.
5.3 Stakeholders Involved in Oil Spill Response and National and International
Framework
5.3.1 Analysis of Stakeholders Affected by the MV Wakashio Oil Spill
A representative from ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation)
informed researchers that when technical experts are on site, they provide consultation
to locals, private sector parties, or hotel or tourist related industries who were affected
by the mv Wakashio Oil Spill for possible claims or compensation. During the
compensation process for victims, he mentioned that rather than a financial
perspective, a technical perspective is used to assess the damage. According to him,
the following victims are prioritized: the fishing industry and community, and hotel or
tourist-related businesses with coastlines. He affirmed that when technical expertise
shares their assessment and information, it is not biased and explained openly to both
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the government and the shipping company involved, as well as their insurance
company.
The Fishing Community
The community had a devastating impact from the incident on their economic and
social structure. This view is shared by the Deputy Director of Shipping Lines in
Mauritius and a representative from ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution
Federation).
The researcher takes following excerpt of the interview given to media by UNDP’s
Resident Representative for Mauritius and Seychelles. According to Serumaga,
essentially the incident has affected the blue economy of Mauritia which is around 20
per cent of the Mauritian economy, and the south-eastern coast relies heavily on
fishing and tourism. Following the oil spill, coastal and marine activities were stopped
for a time and southeast coast of Mauritius were closed to the public to allow for cleanup. Fishing activities were suspended, and some fishermen were unable to maintain
their boats and fishing equipment, resulting in additional repair costs and loss of
equipment. And in many cases, fishing families did not have alternative sources of
income20. UNDP report stated that in the southeast coastline of the island, where 12
village council areas were impacted by the oil spill and there are 630 registered fishers
in the area and hundreds of people fish for subsistence and are not formally recognized
through any registration process are present also. However, the effect on women who
are mostly unregistered fisherwomen as only 35 female fishers are registered in
Mauritius as per the list of registered fishers for 2019. Out of the 35, more than half
operate in the area impacted by the oil spill (UNDP Report on Oil Spill of Mauritius,
2021). According to Rambaree, this disaster affected the livelihood of thousands of
people from the southeast coast of Mauritius and Government of Mauritius had to put
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up a food distribution programme for those in need, and a monthly solidarity grant of
MUR. 10,200 (roughly $257) is being paid from August 2020 to fishers, fishmongers
and pleasure craft licensees/operators/workers from the southeast region to
compensate for the stoppage of sea activities after the oil spill (Rambaree,K,
Rambaree, B., 2021).
Tourism.
According to Serumaga, to consider that in the year 2019 alone, the tourism industry
contributed 8.1 per cent of Mauritius’ GVA [gross value added], with spill overs
estimated at above 20 per cent of GVA. More than 1.4 million tourists visited the island
that year, generating earnings of up to MUR 63 billion ($1.8 billion). The oil spill
threatened domestic and international perceptions around the country’s main tourist
attractions, including sandy beaches and unique biodiversity. Prime Minister Pravind
Jugnauth has declared the country’s approximately 1.3 million inhabitants rely heavily
on tourism, which has already been hard-hit by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and
has been affected by the oil spill. On the other hand, the closure of public beaches also
affected several dependent businesses and many people now rely on alternative
livelihoods such as cash for work through the cleaning exercise, government financial
support and support from non-governmental organizations, community organizations,
neighbours and friends21.
Coastal Community
A representative from the UN mentioned in an interview that there are health effects
from the oil spill. In collaborating with the World Health Organization, it was able to
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diagnose the impact of the crisis on people's health. These health effects can include
allergic reactions, skin rashes, and so on22.
According to Rambaree as stated in his research, "following the oil spill and the cleanup operation, public concern with how the government organized the disaster response
brought widespread protests in the country. On 29 August 2020, approximately
100,000 people joined a peaceful march in the capital to protest against the government
(Cassimally, 2020; DW, 2020). This was the biggest demonstration Mauritius has seen
in forty years (DW, 2020). Another protest took place in the southeast on 12 September
2020. Protesters and critical commentators have deplored the delay in actions as the
ship ran aground, as well as a lack of transparency in the response of the government
to the disaster. They were concerned that late actions might have exacerbated the
negative impact on the environment. The spilled oil has been found to have caused
damage to mangroves and coral reefs, and there are concerns over the effect on marine
mammals, since forty-seven dead and dying dolphins and whales had drifted ashore
by 31 August 2020 (Degnarain, 2020b)"(Rambaree, K., Rambaree, B., 2021).
5.3.2 Stakeholder Response Analysis, Current Status, and Ways Stakeholders Address
the Situation
National Level
The Deputy Director of Shipping Lines in Mauritius, who also worked as a member
of the National Crisis Committee of the Wakashio Oil Spill while participating in the
interview, gave an overview of the crisis to stakeholders involved in the response. The
Ministry of Environment enforces National Oil Spill Contingency Plans (the annual
SCP), which is a public document. Moreover, the Environmental Protection Act was
instrumental during the crisis. Then, the Mauritius Port Authority, which is fully
equipped to oversee their operations and resources, oversees the supply chain and
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manages the National Coast Guard, who possess tugs and booms. Mauritius, unlike
other states, does not possess a navy; instead, the role is played by the Mauritian Coast
Guard, who is part of the police department. These parties have become actively
engaged in the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan23.
1. Ministry of the Environment
2. Mauritius Port Authority
3. The Mauritian Coast Guard and Police Department
The officer from the National Coast Guard of Mauritius who conducted the research
interview provided a brief overview of the National Coast Guard, which the
researchers believe is necessary for analyzing their role as a stakeholder. The National
Coast Guard (NCG) is a specialized unit of the Mauritius Police Force (MPF) which
was established in 1987 and is headed by the Commissioner of Police and
Commandant of NCG, who is responsible for administration and operations. The
Commandant NCG reports to the Commissioner of Police. The NCG Act 1988,
Section 6 (1) (b) defines the duties of the NCG and the protection of the maritime
zones; Section 12 (1) (g), the powers of the NCG in the prevention of maritime
pollution24.
In addition, the officer elaborated on the role of the Ministry of Environment, Solid
Waste Management and Climate Change (MESWMCC), which leads the National Oil
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Available on: http://muelex.govmu.org/portal/sites/muelex/files/coast.pdf
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Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP), which was made under the Environmental
Protection Act (EPA 2002)25.
Community Role
An officer from the National Coast Guard of Mauritius noted that the opportunities for
overcoming the oil spill crisis were community and local. People from all around came
together as one and started to manufacture artisanal booms with sugarcane straws to
trap the oil near the shores. NGOs were mobilized for the shoreline cleanup. It was
also a challenge to manage 100 volunteers and NGOs, especially to ensure that those
involved in the operations are accounted for that all health and safety precautions are
followed due to COVID protocols26.The Mauritius Red Cross supported the creation
of booms from dry leaves and plastic bottles, including in Bois des Amourettes, about
15 minutes from Mahébourg with 100 volunteer participation (Mauritius: MV
Wakashio Oil Spill Flash Update No. 3, OCHA 2020).
An activist who was interviewed for research explained that there were lots of
volunteers who joined together and started making booms to protect the coast from the
oil spill.
During the interview, the person from the NGO mentioned that civil society assisted
in operating skimmers to pump out oil, and people who are more familiar with the
lagoon and the sea were helping the coast guard manage the response.

25

Available on:
https://www.mra.mu/download/TheEnvironmentProtectionAct2002.pdf
26
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International Level
The United Nations
According to the UN representative, the government of Mauritius had requested
assistance from them since they are the ones who coordinate the work of all the
different UN agencies in Mauritius. They had initiated a joint response from the UN
between UN OCHA, UN Environment and the International Maritime Organization.
"The United Nations (UN), under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator,
continues to support the immediate response. UNDP, through regular programs on the
environment, has allocated 200,000 USD and is mobilizing support to communities
through the GEF Small Grants Programme. The International Maritime Organisation
(IMO), together with the UNEP/OCHA Joint Environment Unit, has deployed an oil
spill expert, and IMO is supporting the Government by providing technical advice on
oil spill response issues and in the coordination of assistance. In addition, UNDP is
providing technical support on issues related to the environment, oil spills, and impact
assessment. UNESCO’s Oceanographic Institute is supporting remote mapping, WHO
is supporting public health regulations, IOM is analyzing risks to populations,
UNODC is supporting forensic investigation and providing legal support, UNOSAT
has activated the Space Charter and is providing satellite imagery and analysis, and
OCHA is providing disaster response coordination expertise. International financial
institutions, including the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund, have agreed to offer technical support. More information
about support from UN agencies and other partners will be shared as the response
evolves." (Mauritius: MV Wakashio Oil Spill Flash Update No. 3, OCHA 2020)
The UNDP
UNDP coordinates its contribution with the rest of the UN system. UNDP worked with
IOM to provide on-site technical support for rapid assessment of the socio-economic
impact of the spill on households and to gather relevant information to aid response
planning. On a day-to-day basis, UNDP worked closely with the Ministry of
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Environment, Solid Waste Management and Climate Change and the Ministry of Blue
Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping. The UN Resident Coordinator
leads the UN system response to the Wakashio oil spill disaster27.
The Deputy Director of Shipping Lines in Mauritius discussed with the researcher the
aid they received from their neighbouring countries: Reunion Island (French territory),
India, France, the UK, and Japan. He also noted how foreign aid was delayed and
postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic28.
5.4. Lessons Learnt from the MV Wakashio Oil Spill
5.4.1 Lessons from the mv Wakashio’s Preparedness and Planning Challenges


Monitoring Exclusive Economic Zone and spread the early warning system to
the zone. This was mentioned during the interview of the professor from
Copenhagen University who expressed his opinion, which is that Mauritius
coastal guards ignore the message of vessel accidents in the economic zone29.



Regularly updating contingency plans



Act swiftly during the emergency phase without wasting time.



Establishing and understanding legal provisions



Providing resources, technology, and aids for beach clean-up on a regular basis

27

Eight Transcript

28

Second Transcript

29

Twelfth Transcript

59



Cleaning marine sensitive areas with extra care and using appropriate
techniques



Prepare for planned or predicted risks such as environmental impact with
relevant resources to mitigate it, and claims and plaintiffs with relevant
technological facilities or law and regulations within the country for
transparency.

5.4.2 Future Plans and Recommendations for MV Wakashio Stakeholders
Technology, Development and Research
In the interview, the IMO (International Maritime Organization) special representative
to Mauritius for the Wakashio incident described his experience in the oil spill field in
thirty-five years. He mentioned that during his tenure at the UK government, the team
responsible for research and development for spills and spill response would
deliberately spill oil into coastal areas for research purposes. This is an environmental
offense in contemporary society, but it was different back then. He said that learning
was instrumental as different oils evolved and dissolved differently. Also, this research
method invented oil spill methods currently in force. Unlike in the past, during oil spill
incidents, the number of external issues such as logistics and communications issues
is relatively low. Also, unlike digital cameras, in the past the timeline got dragged due
to 35-millimetre cameras, whose photographs developed months after the incident.
Incident Command System
The officer from the National Coast Guard of Mauritius gave his view on the NCG,
which is a major stakeholder in the NOSCP. Their future plan is structured based on
the Incident Command System (ICS) and the roles and responsibilities of various
organizations are defined. The NCG is part of the Evaluation Cell, Logistics Cell and
Operations Cell. The Operations Cell is headed by the Commissioner of Police and the
Commandant NCG is the On-Scene Commander (OSC) for Operations at Sea. The

60

NCG is a member of the Scientific Advisory Team (SAT) of the NOSCP and
participates in the planning phase during a spill. The NCG may advise on the best
response strategies based on inputs received such as drifts, currents, tides, wind
directions, etc. With regards to preparedness, the NCG has set up a Pollution Response
Team (PRT) which is composed of qualified responders trained to respond to oil spills
at sea. The main responsibilities of NCG PRT are to maintain and operate oil spill
equipment, to carry out regular drills and training in pollution response, to participate
in pollution response at sea, to participate in national, regional and international drills
and exercises, and to build capacity and capability. Moreover, NCG exercises with
various friendly navies and Coast Guards include table top, FTX, and deployment of
equipment and assets30.
5.4.3 Lessons Learned from Other Nations
East Timor-DNTM
The officer from the Maritime Administration in East Timor gave his view on the
National Contingency Plan under way in East Timor. As an officer of the National
Directorate of Maritime Transport (DNTM), their main focus is to prepare the National
Oil Contingency Plan and coordinate with relevant stakeholders in the country to be
involved in the implementation process. In addition, the DNTM is also responsible for
collaborating with neighboring countries in the region, such as Indonesia and
Australia, for possible financial aid, and for the ratification and implementation of the
OPRC Convention. The convention, according to the officer, is not enough to support
the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The reason is the lack of technical
expertise available for these small islandic nations to effectively implement their oil
spill management. Furthermore, the country is considered highly vulnerable to oil
spills because around 90% of the Timorese population live in the coastal area of the
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country, and investments in Dili, the capital of the country, are continuously growing
in coastal and marine tourism areas31.
In Papua New Guinea,
The Member of Papua New Guinea (PNG) National Maritime Safety Authority gave
his opinion in a research interview. The PNG National Maritime Safety Authority’s
oil spill contingency plan is covered under one of our National Marine Pollution Acts,
referred to as the National Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response Act. However,
members expressed that there is a lack of drill or mock response action to test out the
contingency plan, and it is not enough to determine whether the plan is effective or
not. Educating decision makers on the risks associated with oil spills will add more
meaning and value to the issue of oil spill response and contingency planning. While
the organization does put in some effort, also, preparedness needs to be promoted and
given high priority, so in any event that an oil spill occurs, deployment will become
more effective. In the Pacific, regional contingency, which is PACPOL, requires
regional corporations between countries to determine how response can be managed
in the event that spills become Tier 3. In addition, the MOU with Australia through its
Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) allows the deployment of Tier 3
response equipment from the Australian Maritime Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC)32.
Thailand
The researcher interviewed a representative from ITOPF (International Tanker
Owners Pollution Federation) who started his work on site after the end of the
emergency phase, starting in early September. The representative had experience in
Thailand and he shared it for research purposes. Thailand had a port spill in Bangkok,

31

Eleventh Transcript

32

Seventh Transcript

62

which is relatively smaller compared with Mauritius. In that case, their contingency
plan worked defiantly. Coincidently, prior to six months after the incident, Thailand
had training, so when the incident happened, they were fairly refreshed on what they
needed to do. In addition, due to its smaller scale, it was obviously a lot easier to deal
with in comparison to a shoreline impact like Wakashio33.
5.5 Chapter Conclusion
An oil spill inevitably causes damage to the local and/or regional environment,
wildlife, habitats, etc., and to the livelihoods of people. The project phase of the
incident requires a lot of expenses for clean-up, and they may increase if the oil spill
occurs in or near a sensitive wetland. This is the case related to Wakashio. According
to Etkin, oil spill clean-up response costs varied on a variety of factors, most notably,
location, oil type, spill size, and clean-up strategy, making it difficult to develop a
universal per-unit cost factor. Moreover, clean-up strategy also plays a very large role
in determining clean-up costs (Etkin,1998a). In addition, in relation to Wakashio, its
proximity to environmentally, economically, and politically sensitive locations greatly
impact its response costs and strategies. It is noted that small island nations do not
possess an integrated approach to prevention and remediation that accelerates earlywarning protocols and technologies implemented in the first few hours of the
emergency phase. The emergency phase was lagging, which is crucial to the outcome
of remedial efforts in the project phase.
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6.0 Conclusion and Recommendations
6.1 Conclusion
Island nations are vulnerable to oil spill risks due to their limited resources,
dependency on tourism or fishing industries, and lack of mechanisms to mitigate and
prevent such incidents. Therefore, the research aims to examine how an island nation
processes planning, preparation, and response to an oil spill accident.
In order to achieve the aim of the research, the researchers, after careful consideration,
selected the recent oil spill incident in a small island nation, MV Wakashio, Mauritius,
as a special reference. Mauritius, a small island nation of 1.3 million people, located
500 miles off the east coast of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean, faced an ecological
disaster on 25th July 2020.
The purpose of this study is to understand the planning, preparedness, and responses
of island states to oil spills and what the challenges they face are, and how to address
those challenges. For that, the research identifies three research questions: (a) what are
the challenges faced by small island states and developing states in planning,
preparedness, and response to oil spills? (b) How has Mauritius been affected by the
MV Wakashio oil spill? (c) What are the lessons learnt from the MV Wakashio oil
spill? By using the case study approach as a research strategy, the research conducts
in-depth analysis using a single incident.
The significance of the research is that planning for oil spill disasters involves learning
from previous events, and this is especially challenging because consequences are
conditional upon the small island nations' particular geographic, ecological, societal,
and temporal contexts in which the disaster occurs. Therefore, the research fills a
research gap in handling oil spill incidents in small island nations. The scope of the
research is limited to small island nations and case study referral to MV Wakashio.
Also, the significant limitation is the unavailability of some reports due to
confidentiality and those that were not made available as publications. Moreover, the
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researchers could not do an onsite field visit to understand the impact of the oil spill
accident. However, it is essential to keep in mind that although this disaster provides
an essential information source for anticipating future events, not all lessons may be
transferrable across all regions alike.
By using a qualitative research method using primary and secondary findings, the
research analyzed research questions thoroughly to understand the research problem.
The research depends on the literature corpus to systematically analyze the factors and
linkages that would influence the consequences of a potential oil spill. The literature
corpus the research used consisted of event case studies across different geographic
areas. Several previous oil spills in small island states are prominent in the literature
of the research, which include the 2019 Oil Spills in the Solomon Islands and the Oil
Spills in Papua New Guinea in 2012.
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Figure 6: Conceptual framework (Source; Author)
Using primary data collected through open-ended semi-structured interviews, the
research unpacks the project and emergency phase of the accident, stakeholder
behaviour, the claim process, and risks associated with it. Eleven people were
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interviewed from the government, community, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and activists. By using thematic analysis methods, the
themes for analysis are created. After initial analysis, the themes have been identified
and a conceptual framework was made. Figure 06 shows the conceptual framework.
The themes are divided into two, namely, risks and stakeholders.
The risks identified in the research are further elaborated as planned risks related to
having a contingency plan and unplanned risks. At the end, the research analysis shows
the gap and its impact on the environment, the social and the economy of the nation.
Key factors or variables influencing the contingency plan were COVID-19,
inaccessibility to the shoreline, weather and tide waves, nature of the oil spread, lowsulfur fuel oil, and human behaviour. The impacts were identified in several domains
related to the environment, including marine physical environment, marine biology,
human health and society, the economy, and policy. Twelve village council areas were
impacted by the oil spill, and there are 630 registered fishers in the area, and hundreds
of non-registered belong to the affected areas. In addition, approximately 1.3 million
inhabitants who rely heavily on tourism have been hard-hit by the COVID-19
pandemic and oil spill.
The research shows the contingency plan is educating stakeholders and the
community, not limited to running drills. In addition, the successful operation of the
oil spill management and clean up depend on individual leadership decision making
and behaviour. In the case of Mauritius, they had to depend on a contingency plan they
made in 1990, which shows that the country has not updated or periodically reviewed
the plan. Nearly 400 booms had been deployed to protect sensitive areas, and a
command post had been established to monitor the situation (OCHA,2020). It is noted
that the local population, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and community
service groups responded quickly and actively participated in restricting the spread of
oil spills in different ways, using different manual methods to control the spill and
remove oil from the sea surface and along the coast. Also, it has been reported that
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hundreds of Mauritian citizens hurriedly set up locally made booms with sacks filled
with straw and other materials to control the spread of oil.
The sector that was gravely affected by the disaster is the fishing industry. Fisheries
and aquaculture are an important part of the Mauritius economy, accounting for about
1.5% of the GDP. In addition, the residents affected by the disaster are approximately
48,000 Mauritians living in 17 coastal villages along the 30 km shoreline. Other than
these stakeholders, by analyzing the research, it is noted that Ramsar Wetland and Blue
Bay Marine Park are contaminated by low-sulfur fuel oil, causing a grave ecological
disaster. The research provides information on contingency plans, their importance,
the compensation process, and the challenges that come from them.
The research concludes that small island nations do not possess an integrated approach
to prevention and remediation that accelerates early-warning protocols and
technologies implemented in first few hours of the emergency phase. The project phase
of the incident requires much expenses for clean-up and it may increase if oil spill
occurs in or near a sensitive wetland. This is the case related to the mv Wakashio. The
emergency phase was lagged which is crucial to the outcome of remedial efforts in
project phase. In addition, in relation to the mv Wakashio incident, its proximity to
environmentally, economically, and politically sensitive locations greatly impact its
response costs and strategies and it has been noted contingency plan for oil spill had
not created with pandemic being a variable (see Figure 7 as a summary of the incident).
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Vessel Name: mv Wakashio
IMO No:
9337119
Length:
300 m
Width:
50 m
Draught:
8.7 m
DWT:
203130
Fuel On-board: 3,800 tons of Low-Sulphur
fuel oil and 200 tons of
diesel (at the time of
incident)

Flag: Panama
Crew: 20
Owner: Nagashiki Shipping
Charterers: Tokyo-Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd
Insurer: Japan P&I Club
Voyage: Lianyungang, China to Tubarao, Brazil
Incident Date: 25th July 2020
Location: Southeast coast of Blue Bay in front
of Point d’Esny

Response: - Mauritius government activated NOSCP on 26th July 2020
- On 5th of August, the vessel began flooding and sinking and the Prime Minister
declared a national environment emergency and requested international assistance.
Response Equipment Used
Booms – Approx. 15.9 km (HI Sprint
Booms, Near shore Booms, River
Booms)
Skimmers – Disc Skimmers
Heli Skimmers
Absorbent Dam

Ships assisted
MT Elise and MT Tresta Star
French Naval Vessels Champlain
INS Nireekshak

Local community /NGOs: Local community and NGOs responded quickly actively participated in
oil spill management process, specially rigging large quantity of
artisanal booms
International Assistance : France ,Japan
,India
UK,
Australia
Impacts: Fisheries
Tourism (long term)

International Organisation : UNDP,UN
OCHA,IMO ,UNEP,UNODC, ITOPF,IOM

International Conventions Apply
Bunker Convention 2001
LLMC 1976

Challenges Faced
Sulphur Fuel
COVID-19
Lack of accessibility to shore line

Compensation and Liabilities:
-US $ 250000 to 50 Fishermen (by ship owner)
-US $ 9 million over the next few years (P&I Club)
-MOL Charitable Trust" (the Trust) 800 million
Yen (US $ 7.2 million)
- MUR 5100 (Approx. US $ 122) for registered
fishermen monthly by Mauritius government

Figure 7: Summary of the mv Wakashio incident (Source; Author)
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6.2 Recommendations
Based on the conclusion, the research recommends conducting a socio-economical and
human health impact study of oil spill disasters.


It is recommended to conduct a policy level post-disaster intervention and
determine which interventions are essential in reducing losses from a possible
spill event.



It is recommended to make policy and planning aimed at reducing the
likelihood of oil spills, providing effective emergency response, and
facilitating recovery.



Based on the conclusion, the research recommends conducting a comparative
study of oil spill accidents that occurred during and before the COVID-19
pandemic.



For further research, it is recommended to develop a model which can provide
scenarios of potential oil spill impacts in particular localities.



It is recommended to conduct further research on the impacts of low-sulphur
fuel in different marine environments and recommend responses.



It is recommended to conduct further research on the impact of the institution
of health measures such as quarantine, travel restrictions, delayed logistics etc.,
on oil spill response and guidance on accounting for such measures in oil spill
contingency plans.



It is recommended to conduct further research on the challenges of small island
states in preparing for and responding to oil spills.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Time line of the mv Wakashio incident (Source: safety4sea, 2021)
Date

Incident

Remarks

04th July
2020

The Panamanian-flagged MV Wakashio
departs from Lianyungang, China, bound
for Tubarão, Brazil, with 20 crew on
board and no cargo, but having 3,894
tons of low-Sulphur fuel oil, 207 tons of
diesel and 90 tons of lube oil on board.

14th July
2020

Stopped in Singapore for fuelling

23rd July
2020

mv Wakashio entered into the EEZ of
Mauritius

25th July

The ship ran aground at Pointe d'Esny, a
known sanctuary for rare wildlife.

26th July
2020

The government of Mauritius activated
National Oil Spill Contingency Plan

31st July
2020

The advance team of the salvage
company arrived on site by airplane.

It required a longer time than a normal
dispatch due to require PCR testing

04th
August
2020

The second team of the salvage
company arrived on site aboard the
salvage boat

The ship-owner arranged salvage
operation began, but was hampered by
adverse weather.

05th
August
2020

A minor oil slick was observed
surrounding the vessel

It was still assumed that the country’s
contingency plan was sufficient and that ‘the
risk of oil spill was still low.
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06th
August
2020

The vessel began flooding and sinking. It
then split into two and spilled at least
1,000 tons of oil into the Indian Ocean

Mauritius authorities were trying to control
the spill.

07th
August
2020

Prime Minister Pravind Jugnauth
declared a national environment
emergency.

Mauritius government said “this is the first
time that we are faced with a catastrophe of
this kind and we are insufficiently equipped
to handle this problem.” Then Mauritius
called for international help once the scale
of the emergency became apparent and
quickly overwhelmed the resources and
capacity of the country’s national
contingency plan

08th
August
2020

Two supporting tankers, MY Elise and MT
Tresta Star arrived close to mv Wakashio

Two tankers were used to get the pumped
out fuel from mv Wakashio

08th
August
2020

Extent of the slick seen around the protected
Ile aux Aigrettes islands and heading toward
the historic Port City of Mahebourg

09th
August
2020

Deployment of the handmade oil protection
booms along the Mahebourg Waterfront and
around the Blue Bay Marine Park

Thousands of volunteers in Mauritius
gathered handmade oil protection booms which
made out from dried sugar cane leaves

11th
August
2020

Oil slick has expanded to almost ten times its
original size since the vessel first started
leaking heavy oil into the coastal waters on
6th of August. Further, the front of the vessel
rising out above the water as the crack along
its hull widens.

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellites
showed that the size of the oil slick and high
resolution satellite image from Planet revealed
the crack of the hull

12th
August
2020

3000 tons of fuel were removed from the
ship with the help of helicopter and to
another ship also owned by Nagashiki
Shipping.
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12th
August
2020

IMO announces it has deployed an
expert, jointly with the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UN OCHA),

To support the Government of Mauritius by
providing technical advice on issues related
to oil spill response.

15th
August
2020

The ship breaks in two with 166 tons of
fuel on board

Waves 4.5 meters high hinder clean-up.

19th
August
2020

Refloating operation of the forward
part of the hull was completed

19th
August
2020

NGO Greenpeace warns of the severe
environmental consequences after the
government’s decision to sink the front
part of the vessel.

22nd
August
2020

Operations to sink the forward part of the
ill-fated vessel are completed, despite
environmental concerns.

23rd
August
2020

The first clean-up equipment sent by
MOL, has arrived in Mauritius

26th -28th
August
2020

At least 40 dead dolphins gradually
wash up on Mauritius’s shore

28th
August
2020

Government of Mauritius declared the
area from Trou d`Eau Douce to Le
Bouchon ban on fishing, swimming and
all other marine activities

29th
August
2020

Thousands of people demonstrate in
Mauritius over the government’s
handling of the incident
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Suspicions that the oil spill is to blame

08th
September
2020

The Panama Maritime Authority,
collaborating in the accident
investigation, issues the first official
statement, attributing the grounding to
wrong charts

11th
September
2020

MOL announced to provide long-term
contributions to the environment and
the society of Mauritius

05th
November
2020

Japanese ship-owner, Nagashiki
Shipping, appoints Chinese salver,
Lianyungang Dali Underwater
Engineering, to start the removal
operations for the stern of the ship.

18th
December
2020

Japanese MOL, the charterer of the
vessel, releases internal investigation
report on the incident

Identifying the crew’s unsafe behaviour
probable cause of the incident, and issues a
series of safety measures to prevent such
incidents in the future. The measures
announced aim, among others, to address
the lack of safety awareness and boost ship
operation quality

21st June
2021

MOL has established the "MOL
Charitable Trust" (the Trust) in the
Republic of Mauritius

As part of its benevolent and
philanthropic actions to support
activities for the public benefits of
Mauritius and its people to address the
impacts of the oil spill
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With the support and cooperation of
experts and organizations with
specialized knowledge of
environmental restoration and
protection, and working closely with
the government of Japan

Appendix B: Interview Guide
(1) Could you explain the specific role of your organization in oil spill contingency
planning, preparedness, response, and co-operation.?
(2) Could please describe involvement of your organization in liabilities and
compensation process?
(3) Would you like to share your experience in managing any previous oil spill,
especially in island states? And also, your experience in Wakashio incident
(4) Would you mind sharing effectiveness of the Mauritius oil spill contingency plan
during the Wakashio incident?
(5) Could you please describe the challenges you faced during mv Wakashio
incident?
(6) Based on the mv Wakashio experiences what measures could be taken to
overcome contingency plan implementation issues?
(7) Could you explain your perspective in regional and international cooperation
during this Wakashio incident?
(8) Would you like to comment on the international conventions regarding the oil
spills preparedness and response and legal regime for oil pollution damage?
(9) What is your opinion on the adequacy of current international instruments
addressing oil spills such as Wakashio incident and States?
(10) Could you explain your perspective about why Island States are not able to
effectively manage the oil spills after having the oil spill contingency plans and the
complying all the international instruments/ conventions regarding the oil spills
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Appendix C: Personnel mobilized during the m.v. Wakashio incident

Country/
Internati
onal
Organiza
tion

Experts

Designation

Area of Expertise

Arrival
Date

France/Re
union
Island

Body Jacques

Commander of Frigate Liaison Officer

Evaluation, needs
assessment, strategic
response development
for short, medium and
longer terms,
preparation of
deployment and
response plans

07-Aug20

France/Re
union
Island

Abeilard
Anton

Expert DMSOI - POLMAR
- Ministry of Ecological
and Solidarity Transition

Advise the NCGs, SMF
and other relevant
actors on deployment
on site

07-Aug20

France/Re
union
Island

Lortet Alan

Master - Anti-pollution cell
of the naval base - French
Navy

Advise the NCGs, SMF
and other relevant
actors on deployment
of resources on site
(land and sea)

07-Aug20

France/Re
union
Island

Bailly Gaelle

Captain

France/Re
union
Island

Lesven Bruno

Civil

Japan

Imai Ken

Senior Director of Japan
International Cooperation
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Expert from CEPPOL Center of Practical
Expertise in
Antipollution Control

17-Aug20

Expert from CEPPOL –
(Center of Practical
Expertise in
Antipollution Control)

17-Aug20

Advise the NCGs, SMF
and other relevant
actors on deployment

11-Aug20

Agency (Assistant Team
Leader)

of resoures on site (land
and sea)

Japan

Takechi Keiji

Coast Guard Officer,
Expert on Oil Spill

Advise the NCGs, SMF
and other relevant
actors on deployment
of resoures on site (land
and sea)

11-Aug20

Japan

Otsuka
Hisashi

Coast Guard Officer,
Expert on Oil Spill

Advise the NCGs, SMF
and other relevant
actors on deployment
of resoures on site (land
and sea)

11-Aug20

United
Nations

Gelas Pierre

UN Office for Coordination
of Humanitarian Assistance

Assess, evaluate and
develop strategic
response for short,
medium and long term

11-Aug20

United
Nations

Masibo Helen

UN Office for Coordination
of Humanitarian Assistance

Environmental and
social impact
assessment team

11-Aug20

United
Nations

Sommerville
Matthew

Independent oil spill expert
deployed by International
Maritime
Organisation/UNEP/OCHA

Environmental and
social impact
assessment team

11-Aug20

United
Nations

O'connell
David

UN Office on Drugs and
Crimes

Environmental and
social impact
assessment team

11-Aug20

United
Nations

Nallainathan
Amalraj

International Migration
Organiation

Environmental and
social impact
assessment team

11-Aug20

United
Nations

Bogdan Silviu
Danila

International Migration
Organiation (IOM)

Environmental and
social impact
assessment team

13-Aug20

United
Nations

Kwenin
Charles

UN IOM Regional Director
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13-Aug20

India

Das Amitava

Commandant

Advise the NCGs, SMF
and other relevant
actors on deployment
of resoures on site (land
and sea)

16-Aug20

India

Siddiqui Arif
Iqbal

PSE(P)

Advise the NCGs, SMF
and other relevant
actors on deployment
of resoures on site (land
and sea)

16-Aug20

India

Raj Prem

PSE(P)

Advise the NCGs, SMF
and other relevant
actors on deployment
of resoures on site (land
and sea)

16-Aug20

UK

Dr Suzanne
Ware

Chair of England's
Pollution Response in
Emergencies

20-Aug20

UK

Dr Phillippe
Bersuder

Senior analytical chemist

20-Aug20
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